| |
Laboratory Biosafety Level 4 (BSL 4)
Biosafety Level 4 is required for work
with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted
laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. Agents with a close or identical
antigenic relationship to Biosafety Level 4 agents are handled at this level until
sufficient data are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to work
with them at a lower level. Members of the laboratory staff have specific and thorough
training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents and they understand the primary
and secondary containment functions of the standard and special practices, the containment
equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. They are supervised by competent
scientists who are trained and experienced in working with these agents. Access to the
laboratory is strictly controlled by the laboratory director. The facility is either in a
separate building or in a controlled area within a building, which is completely isolated
from all other areas of the building. A specific facility operations manual is prepared or
adopted. Within work areas of the facility, all activities
are confined to Class III biological safety cabinets, or Class II biological safety
cabinets used with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life
support system. The Biosafety Level 4 laboratory has special engineering and design
features to prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment.
The following standard and special safety practices equipment, and
facilities apply to agents assigned to Biosafety Level 4:
A. Standard Microbiological Practices
1. Access to the laboratory is limited by the laboratory director
when experiments are in progress.
2. Policies for safe handling of sharps are instituted.
3. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation
of aerosols.
4. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after
any spill of viable material.
5. All waste is decontaminated before disposal by an approved method
such as autoclaving.
6. An insect and rodent control program is in effect (see Appendix
G).
B. Special Practices
1. Only persons whose presence in the facility or individual
laboratory rooms is required for program or support purposes are authorized to enter.
Persons who are immunocompromised or immunosuppressed may be at risk of acquiring
infections. Therefore, persons who may be at increased risk of acquiring infection or for
whom infection may be unusually hazardous, such as children or pregnant women, are not
allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms.
The supervisor has the final responsibility for assessing
each circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the laboratory. Access to the
facility is limited by means of secure, locked doors; accessibility is managed by the
laboratory director, biohazard control officer, or other person responsible for the
physical security of the facility. Before entering, persons are advised of the potential
biohazards and instructed as to appropriate safeguards for ensuring their safety.
Authorized persons comply with the instructions and all other applicable entry and exit
procedures. A logbook, signed by all personnel, indicates the date and time of each entry
and exit. Practical and effective protocols for emergency situations are established.
2. When infectious materials or infected animals are present in the
laboratory or animal rooms, hazard warning signs, incorporating the universal biohazard
symbol, are posted on all access doors. The sign identifies the agent, lists the name of
the laboratory director or other responsible person(s), and indicates any special
requirements for entering the area (e.g., the need for immunizations or respirators).
3. The laboratory director is responsible for ensuring
that, before working with organisms at Biosafety Level 4, all personnel demonstrate a high
proficiency in standard microbiological practices and techniques, and in the special
practices and operations specific to the laboratory facility. This might include prior
experience in handling human pathogens or cell cultures, or a specific training program
provided by the laboratory director or other competent scientist proficient in these
unique safe microbiological practices and techniques.
4. Laboratory personnel receive available immunizations for the
agents handed or potentially present in the laboratory.
5. Baseline serum samples for all laboratory and other at-risk
personnel are collected and stored. Additional serum specimens may be periodically
collected, depending on the agents handled or the function of the laboratory. The decision
to establish a serologic surveillance program takes into account the availability of
methods for the assessment of antibody to the agent(s) of concern. The program provides
for the testing of serum samples at each collection interval and the communication of
results to the participants.
6. A biosafety manual is prepared or adopted. Personnel are advised
of special hazards and are required to read and follow instructions on practices and
procedures.
7. Laboratory and support personnel receive appropriate training on
the potential hazards associated with the work involved, the necessary precautions to
prevent exposures, and the exposure evaluation procedures. Personnel receive annual
updates or additional training as necessary for procedural changes.
8. Personnel enter and leave the laboratory only through the
clothing change and shower rooms. They take a decontaminating shower each time they leave
the laboratory. Personnel use the airlocks to enter or leave the laboratory only in an
emergency.
9. Personal clothing is removed in the outer clothing change room
and kept there. Complete laboratory clothing, including undergarments, pants and shirts or
jumpsuits, shoes, and gloves, is provided and used by all personnel entering the
laboratory. When leaving the laboratory and before proceeding into the shower area,
personnel remove their laboratory clothing in the inner change room. Soiled clothing is
autoclaved before laundering.
10. Supplies and materials needed in the facility are brought in by
way of the double-doored autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock, which is appropriately
decontaminated between each use. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the
facility retrieve the materials by opening the interior doors of the autoclave, fumigation
chamber, or airlock. These doors are secured after materials are brought into the
facility.
11. A high degree of precaution must always be taken with any
contaminated sharp items, including needles and syringes, slides, pipettes, capillary
tubes, and scalpels.
a. Needles and syringes or other sharp instruments are restricted in
the laboratory for use only when there is no alternative, such as for parenteral
injection, phlebotomy, or aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm
bottles. Plasticware should be substituted for glassware whenever possible.
b. Only needle-locking syringes or disposable syringe-needle units
(i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) are used for injection or aspiration of
infectious materials. Used disposable needles must not be bent, sheared, broken, recapped,
removed from disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand before disposal;
rather, they must be carefully placed in conveniently located puncture-resistant
containers used for sharps disposal. Non-disposable sharps must be placed in a hard-walled
container for transport to a processing area for decontamination, preferably by
autoclaving.
c. Syringes that re-sheath the needle, needleless systems, and other
safety devices are used when appropriate.
d. Broken glassware must not be handled directly by hand, but must
be removed by mechanical means such as a brush and dustpan, tongs, or forceps. Containers
of contaminated needles, sharp equipment, and broken glass must be decontaminated before
disposal, according to any local, state, or federal regulations.
12. Biological materials to be removed from the Class III cabinet or
from the Biosafety Level 4 laboratory in a viable or intact state are transferred to a
nonbreakable, sealed primary container and then enclosed in a nonbreakable, sealed
secondary container. This is removed from the facility through a disinfectant dunk tank,
fumigation chamber, or an airlock designed for this purpose.
13. No materials, except biological materials that are to remain in
a viable or intact state, are removed from the Biosafety Level 4 laboratory unless they
have been autoclaved or decontaminated before they leave the laboratory. Equipment or
material that might be damaged by high temperatures or steam may be decontaminated by
gaseous or vapor methods in an airlock or chamber designed for this purpose.
14. Laboratory equipment is decontaminated routinely after work with
infectious materials is finished, and especially after overt spills, splashes, or other
contamination with infectious materials. Equipment is decontaminated before it is sent for
repair or maintenance.
15. Spills of infectious materials are contained and cleaned up by
appropriate professional staff or others properly trained and equipped to work with
concentrated infectious material. A spill procedure is developed and posted within the
laboratory.
16. A system is established for reporting laboratory accidents and
exposures and employee absenteeism, and for the medical surveillance of potential
laboratory-associated illnesses. Written records are prepared and maintained. An essential
adjunct to such a reporting-surveillance system is the availability of a facility for the
quarantine, isolation, and medical care of personnel with potential or known
laboratory-associated illnesses.
17. Materials not related to the experiment being conducted (e.g.,
plants, animals, and clothing) are not permitted in the facility.
C. Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)
All procedures within the facility are conducted in the Class III
biological safety cabinet or in Class II biological safety cabinets used in conjunction
with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life support system.
D. Laboratory Facility (Secondary Barriers)
There are two models for Biosafety Level 4 laboratories: (A) the
Cabinet Laboratory where all handling of the agent is performed in a Class III Biological
Safety Cabinet, and (B) the Suit Laboratory where personnel wear a protective suit.
Biosafety Level-4 laboratories may be based on either model or a combination of both
models in the same facility. If a combination is used, each type must meet all the
requirements identified for that type.
(A) Cabinet Laboratory (See Appendix A)
1. The Biosafety Level 4 facility consists of either a separate
building or a clearly demarcated and isolated zone within a building. The rooms in the
facility are arranged to ensure passage through a minimum of two doors prior to entering
the room(s) containing the Class III biological safety cabinet (cabinet room). Outer and
inner change rooms separated by a shower are provided for personnel entering and leaving
the cabinet room. A double-door autoclave, dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or ventilated
anteroom for decontamination is provided at the containment barrier for passage of those
materials, supplies, or equipment that are not brought into the cabinet room through the
change room.
2. Daily inspections of all containment parameters (e.g.,
directional airflow) and life support systems are completed before laboratory work is
initiated to ensure that the laboratory is operating according to its operating
parameters.
3. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the cabinet room and inner change
room are constructed to form a sealed internal shell which facilitates fumigation and is
resistant to entry and exit of animals and insects. Floors are integrally sealed and
coved. The internal surfaces of this shell are resistant to liquids and chemicals to
facilitate cleaning and decontamination of the area. All penetrations in these structures
and surfaces are sealed. Openings around doors into the cabinet room and inner change room
are minimized and are capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination. Any drains in
the cabinet room floor are connected directly to the liquid waste decontamination system.
Sewer vents and other service lines contain HEPA filters and protection against vermin.
4. Bench tops have seamless or sealed surfaces which are impervious
to water and are resistant to moderate heat and the organic solvents, acids, alkalis, and
chemicals used to decontaminate the work surfaces and equipment.
5. Laboratory furniture is of simple open construction, capable of
supporting anticipated loading and uses. Spaces between benches, cabinets, and equipment
are accessible for cleaning and decontamination. Chairs and other furniture used in
laboratory work should be covered with a non-fabric material that can be easily
decontaminated.
6. A hands-free or automatically operated handwashing sink is
provided near the door of the cabinet room(s) and the outer and inner change rooms.
7. If there is a central vacuum system, it does not serve areas
outside the cabinet room. In-line HEPA filters are placed as near as practicable to each
use point or service cock. Filters are installed to permit in-place decontamination and
replacement. Other liquid and gas services to the cabinet room are protected by devices
that prevent backflow.
8. If water fountains are provided, they are automatically or
foot-operated and are located in the facility corridors outside the laboratory. The water
service to the fountain is isolated from the distribution system supplying water to the
laboratory areas and is equipped with a backflow preventer.
9. Access doors to the laboratory are self-closing and lockable.
10. Any windows are breakage-resistant and sealed.
11. Double-door autoclaves are provided for decontaminating
materials passing out of both the Class III biological safety cabinet(s) and the cabinet
room(s). Autoclaves that open outside of the containment barrier must be sealed to the
wall of the containment barrier. The autoclave doors are automatically controlled so that
the outside door can only be opened after the autoclave "sterilization" cycle
has been completed.
12. Pass-through dunk tanks, fumigation chambers, or equivalent
decontamination methods are provided so that materials and equipment that cannot be
decontaminated in the autoclave can be safely removed from both the Class III biological
safety cabinet(s) and the cabinet room(s).
13. Liquid effluents from the dirty-side inner change room
(including toilets) and cabinet room sinks, floor drains (if used), autoclave chambers,
and other sources within the cabinet room are decontaminated by a proven method,
preferably heat treatment, before being discharged to the sanitary sewer. Effluents from
showers and clean-side toilets may be discharged to the sanitary sewer without treatment.
The process used for decontamination of liquid wastes must be validated physically and
biologically.
14. A dedicated non-recirculating ventilation system is provided.
The supply and exhaust components of the system are balanced to ensure directional airflow
from the area of least hazard to the area(s) of greatest potential hazard. The
differential pressure/directional airflow between adjacent areas is monitored and alarmed
to indicate any system malfunction. An appropriate visual pressure monitoring device that
indicates and confirms the pressure differential of the cabinet room is provided and
located at the entry to the clean change room. The airflow in the supply and exhaust
components is monitored and the HVAC control system is designed to prevent sustained
positive pressurization of the laboratory. The Class III cabinet should be directly
connected to the exhaust system. If the Class III cabinet is connected to the supply
system, it is done in a manner that prevents positive pressurization of the cabinet.
15. The supply air to and exhaust air from the cabinet room, inner
change room, and anteroom pass through HEPA filter(s). The air is discharged away from
occupied spaces and air intakes. The HEPA filter(s) are located as near as practicable to
the source in order to minimize the length of potentially contaminated ductwork. All HEPA
filters need to be tested and certified annually. The HEPA filter housings are designed to
allow for in situ decontamination of the filter prior to removal, or removal of
the filter in a sealed, gas-tight primary container for subsequent decontamination and/or
destruction by incineration. The design of the HEPA filter housing should facilitate
validation of the filter installation. The use of pre-certified HEPA filters can be an
advantage. The service life of the exhaust HEPA filters can be extended through adequate
prefiltration of the supply air.
16. The Biosafety Level 4 facility design and operational procedures
must be documented. The facility must be tested for verification that the design and
operational parameters have been met prior to operation. Facilities should be re-verified
annually against these procedures as modified by operational experience.
17. Appropriate communication systems are provided between the
laboratory and the outside (e.g., voice, fax, computer).
(B) Suit Laboratory
1. The Biosafety Level 4 facility consists of either a separate
building or a clearly demarcated and isolated zone within a building. The rooms in the
facility are arranged to ensure passage through the changing and decontamination areas
prior to entering the room(s) where work is done with BSL-4 agents (suit area). Outer and
inner change rooms separated by a shower are provided for personnel entering and leaving
the suit area. A specially designed suit area is maintained in the facility to provide
personnel protection equivalent to that provided by Class III biological safety cabinets.
Personnel who enter this area wear a one-piece positive pressure suit that is ventilated
by a life-support system protected by HEPA filtration. The life support system includes
redundant breathing air compressors, alarms and emergency backup breathing air tanks.
Entry to this area is through an airlock fitted with airtight doors. A chemical shower is
provided to decontaminate the surface of the suit before the worker leaves the area. An
automatically starting emergency power source is provided at a minimum for the exhaust
system, life support systems, alarms, lighting, entry and exit controls, and BSCs.. The
air pressure within the suit is positive to the surrounding laboratory. The air pressure
within the suit area is lower than that of any adjacent area. Emergency lighting and
communication systems are provided. All penetrations into the internal shell of the suit
area, chemical shower, and airlocks, are sealed.
2. A daily inspection of all containment parameters (e.g.,
directional airflow, chemical showers) and life support systems is completed before
laboratory work is initiated to ensure that the laboratory is operating according to its
operating parameters.
3. A double-doored autoclave is provided at the containment barrier
for decontaminating waste materials to be removed from the suit area. The autoclave door,
which opens to the area external to the suit area, is sealed to the outer wall of the suit
area and is automatically controlled so that the outside door can be opened only after the
autoclave "sterilization" cycle. A dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or ventilated
airlock for decontamination is provided for passage of materials, supplies, or equipment
that are not brought into the suit area through the change room. These devices can be also
used for the safe removal of materials, supplies, or equipment from the laboratory that
cannot be decontaminated in the autoclave.
4. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the suit area are constructed to
form a sealed internal shell, which facilitates fumigation and is animal and insect
prohibitive (see Appendix G). The internal surfaces of this shell are resistant to liquids
and chemicals, facilitating cleaning and decontamination of the area. All penetrations in
these structures and surfaces are sealed. Any drains in the floor of the suit area contain
traps filled with a chemical disinfectant of demonstrated efficacy against the target
agent, and they are connected directly to the liquid waste decontamination system. Sewer
vents and other service lines contain HEPA filters.
5. Internal facility appurtenances in the suit area, such as light
fixtures, air ducts, and utility pipes, are arranged to minimize the horizontal surface
area.
6. Bench tops have seamless surfaces which are impervious to water
and are resistant to moderate heat and the organic solvents, acids, alkalis, and chemicals
used to decontaminate the work surfaces and equipment.
7. Laboratory furniture is of simple open construction capable of
supporting anticipated loading and uses. Non-porous materials are preferable. Spaces
between benches, cabinets, and equipment are accessible for cleaning and decontamination.
Chairs and other furniture used in laboratory work should be covered with a non-fabric
material that can be easily decontaminated.
8. A hands-free or automatically operated handwashing sink is
provided in the suit area(s); handwashing sinks in the outer and inner change rooms should
be considered based on the risk assessment.
9. If there is a central vacuum system, it does not serve areas
outside the suit area. In-line HEPA filters are placed as near as practicable to each use
point or service cock. Filters are installed to permit in-place decontamination and
replacement. Other liquid and gas services to the suit area are protected by devices that
prevent backflow.
10. Access doors to the laboratory are self-closing and lockable.
Inner and outer doors to the chemical shower and inner and outer doors to airlocks are
interlocked to prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously.
11. Any windows are breakage-resistant and are sealed.
12. Liquid effluents from sinks, floor drains (if used), autoclave
chambers and other sources within the containment barrier are decontaminated by a proven
method, preferably heat treatment, before being discharged to the sanitary sewer.
Effluents from showers and toilets may be discharged to the sanitary sewer without
treatment. The process used for decontamination of liquid wastes must be validated
physically and biologically.
13. A dedicated non-recirculating ventilation system is provided.
The supply and exhaust components of the system are balanced to ensure directional airflow
from the area of least hazard to the area(s) of greatest potential hazard. Redundant
supply fans are recommended. Redundant exhaust fans are required. The differential
pressure/directional airflow between adjacent areas is monitored and alarmed to indicate
malfunction of the system. An appropriate visual pressure monitoring device that indicates
and confirms the pressure differential of the suit area must be provided and located at
the entry to the clean change room. The airflow in the supply and exhaust components is
monitored and an HVAC control system is installed to prevent positive pressurization of
the laboratory.
14. The supply air to the suit area, decontamination shower, and
decontamination airlock is protected by passage through a HEPA filter. The general room
exhaust air from the suit area, decontamination shower and decontamination airlock is
treated by a passage through two HEPA filters in series prior to discharge to the outside.
The air is discharged away from occupied spaces and air intakes. The HEPA filters are
located as near as practicable to the source in order to minimize the length of
potentially contaminated ductwork. All HEPA filters need to be tested and certified
annually. The HEPA filter housings are designed to allow for in situ
decontamination of the filter prior to removal. Alternatively, the filter can be removed
in a sealed, gas-tight primary container for subsequent decontamination and/or destruction
by incineration. The design of the HEPA filter housing should facilitate validation of the
filter installation. The use of pre-certified HEPA filters can be an advantage. The
service life of the exhaust HEPA filters can be extended through adequate prefiltration of
the supply air.
15. The positioning of the supply and exhaust points should be such
that dead air space in the suit room is minimized.
16. The treated exhaust air from Class II biological safety
cabinets, located in a facility where workers wear a positive pressure suit, may be
discharged into the room environment or to the outside through the facility air exhaust
system. If the treated exhaust is discharged to the outside through the facility exhaust
system, it is connected to this system in a manner that avoids any interference with the
air balance of the cabinets or the facility exhaust system.
17. The Biosafety Level 4 facility design and operational procedures
must be documented. The facility must be tested for verification that the design and
operational parameters have been met prior to operation. Facilities should be re-verified
annually against these procedures as modified by operational experience.
18. Appropriate communication systems should be provided between the
laboratory and the outside.

This page last reviewed: June 17, 1999
|